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KOREA [] and []

1. Across-the-table talks held only hope for peace--Prime Minister Nehru has taken the position, in discussing the Korean crisis with US Ambassador Henderson in New Delhi, that the only hope of preventing the onrush of war lies in across-the-table talks among the powers most immediately concerned, such as the US, UK, USSR, and Communist China. Nehru acknowledged that collective opposition to aggression seemed in the long run the most effective deterrent to war but urged that when the house is on fire, efforts for the moment must be concentrated on extinguishing the fire rather than on applying fire prevention methods. He expressed the fear that perhaps it is already too late for talks among the great powers, that war is perhaps inevitable, and that all that is left to do is for each power to get into the war, or to keep out of war as gracefully as possible. He also expressed concern lest the Chinese Communists had already decided that war was inevitable and therefore could not be deflected from their course.
2. Yugoslav estimate of Chinese intentions--Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj, in assuring US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade that the Yugoslav delegation at the UN has been instructed to seek passage by the General Assembly of the Security Council resolution on Chinese intervention in Korea, expressed the hope that an honorable solution to the Korean situation could be found which would prevent the extension of hostilities. Kardelj said he had received no intimation, however, that the Chinese Communists had become "reasonable" and attributed Chinese intervention in Korea primarily to the

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expansionist tendency of the Peiping regime and its desire to detract Chinese attention from internal difficulties. Kardelj believes that the intervention, although supported by the USSR, was primarily undertaken at Peiping's initiative; he suspects that the Chinese may have gone into Korea in larger force than Moscow wanted.

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3. Information concerning Chinese Communist intentions-- US Consul Bombay has forwarded a 19 November press dispatch (reportedly suppressed by the Indian Government and a British news agency) from an Indian journalist, recently returned from China, who is considered by the Consul to be an "unusually good observer." According to this dispatch, Chinese Communist leaders had decided by 19 November to intervene deliberately in Korea, had completed plans to throw half a million of their finest troops into Korea, were fully prepared to face any consequences, and had received a pledge of Soviet assistance in the event their campaign to drive UN troops down the length of the Korean peninsula should meet with reverses or defeat. The dispatch cites "authoritative information" from Peiping indicating that the Chinese Communists had signed a secret agreement with the USSR in October to end the threat of "imperialist aggression" and had accepted the Soviet views that the US intends to destroy the Communist regime in China and therefore the best defense was a well-timed and well-prepared offensive action in Korea. The Indian journalist reportedly believes that Indian Ambassador Pannikar in Peiping now recognizes the true intentions of the Chinese Communists but is still "sugar-coating" reports to New Delhi for fear he might lose prestige and the confidence of Nehru.

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EUROPE

4. FRANCE: Analysis of French reaction to Korean crisis--
US Embassy Paris reports that the feeling is being increasingly encountered among the French that it is incumbent upon France, together with the UK, to exercise a moderating influence on the US in order to avoid a major war in the Far East. The Embassy says that what the French fear at this time is a spontaneous reaction of US public opinion to a challenge and a quick, decisive response by the US Government. The Embassy analyzes this fear as springing from such latent feelings as: (a) geographic and political factors might lead the US to decide more lightly than Western Europe about war and peace; (b) the US might be impelled to make military commitments not in its own interests and therefore not in Europe's interests; (c) the US has not in the past listened sufficiently to counsels of moderation from its allies; and (d) France and Britain must now play the role of moderators and detached advisers to their mighty and much-needed friend. Underlying these feelings, the Embassy emphasizes, is to be found the French belief that they are naked in the face of possible Soviet aggression in Europe and the paramount French fear of a Soviet military occupation, even of short duration.

The Embassy believes that despite these feelings, the US can take at face value the recent statements by Premier Pleven and Foreign Minister Schuman concerning French unity with the West and firm adherence to the UN and the principle of collective security. In the Embassy's view, France can be counted on to make its contribution to the building up of strength and unity in Europe and the defense of Indochina. Concerning the Far East, however, the Embassy warns that France's war is in Indochina, not Korea, and that therefore the French would find comparatively palatable a compromise solution which would involve a return to the 38th Parallel and admission of Communist China to the UN.

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NEAR EAST-AFRICA

5. IRAN: Korean crisis causing loss of faith in US--US
Embassy Tehran reports that the reaction in Iran to the
current Korean situation is an increasing loss of faith
in the power of the US to resist Soviet aggression be-
cause the US cannot resist "satellite Communist forces."
According to the Embassy, there is also a stronger feeling
that Iran should remain entirely neutral, continuing en-
deavors to restore the balance of great powers in Iran,
according to former Iranian policy.

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6. PAKISTAN: Anti-Western sentiment growing--US Ambas-
sador Warren reports rapidly growing restiveness in
Pakistan over the lack of progress in resolving differences
with India, particularly the Kashmir dispute. Warren points
out that as this frustration grows it will impair the domestic
political position of Prime Minister Liaquat, who has already
been under sporadic attack for fruitless "collaboration with
the Anglo-American bloc," which is accused of taking Pakistan
for granted and bending all its efforts to conciliate India. Warren
anticipates that Liaquat, even though he may see no imminent
threat to his leadership, may quite possibly find it expedient to
manifest greater independence of the Western Powers or even
take up a "third position."

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